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Changes to the Best Mode Requirement in the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: Why 
Congress Got It Right 
INTRODUCTION 
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA),
1
 signed into law on 
September 16, 2011, represents the most significant overhaul of the United 
States Patent system since the Patent Act of 1952.  In addition to making 
the United States a “first-to-file” system,2 which is more in line with the 
patent law of other countries, the act institutes numerous other changes 
aimed at ensuring that the United States “maintains its competitive edge in 
the global economy.”3  One of these changes eliminates failure to disclose 
the best mode as a defense in patent infringement litigation.
4
  Proponents 
applaud the change for the positive effect it will have on patent litigation, 
specifically, reducing the time and cost of litigation by eliminating pre-trial 
discovery associated with trying to ascertain what the inventor knew when 
the patent application was filed.
5
  The critics bemoan the change, arguing 
that the law removes the only enforcement mechanism to ensure that the 
inventor will fully disclose the invention to the public.
6
  This Comment ex-
plores the reasons for making the change, the practical effect those changes 
will have on best mode disclosure, and why the new law will not have the 
undesirable effect of reducing best mode disclosure. 
Essentially, a patent is a kind of quid pro quo between inventors and 
the public.  In exchange for enabling the public to practice the invention by 
disclosing “the manner and process of making and using [the invention] in 
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in 
 
 1. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be 
codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 2. Id. § 3, 125 Stat. at 285. 
 3. Wesley D. Markham, Is Best Mode the Worst?  Dueling Arguments, Empirical 
Analysis, and Recommendations for Reform, 51 IDEA 129, 131 (2011) (quoting S. Rep. No. 
111-18, at 1–2 (2009)). 
 4. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, § 15, 125 Stat. at 328. 
 5. Markham, supra note 3, at 133. 
 6. Id. at 134. 
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the art to . . . make and use the same,”7 the government grants the inventor 
the exclusive right to sell, make, and use the invention for a certain period 
of time.
8
  This bargain between the inventor and the public also requires 
that the inventor “set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor [for] 
carrying out his invention.”9  The best mode requirement is in place to “re-
strain inventors from applying for patents while at the same time conceal-
ing from the public preferred embodiments of their inventions.”10  Without 
the best mode requirement, inventors could enable the public to practice 
their invention without disclosing to the public the best way to practice the 
invention, thereby depriving the public of their complete share in the bar-
gain—i.e., knowledge of the inventor’s full invention.11 
A simplified example involves the inventor who receives a patent on a 
process (recipe) for making muffins—“extra delicious” muffins that are 
new and non-obvious.
12
  Conceivably, the inventor’s patent could teach that 
her process for making these muffins is to bake them somewhere between 
100 and 1000 degrees until golden brown.  However, if the inventor knows 
at the time she files for her patent that the muffins are most delicious only 
when baked at 350 degrees for twenty minutes, she has an advantage when 
the patent expires.  The public will not know how to make the most deli-
cious version of the muffin because it is not disclosed in the patent and her 
virtual monopoly on the “extra delicious” muffin market will continue be-
yond the patent term.  The inventor can protect the best mode of practicing 
the invention (baking at 350 degrees for 20 minutes) as a trade secret and 
therefore receive additional protection on her invention—both the patent 
law protection and trade secret law protection.
13
  While it is true that the 
 
 7. 35 U.S.C § 112 (2006).  This language is commonly referred to as the “enabling 
requirement.” 
 8. Id. § 154.  As of June 8, 1995, the patent term is 20 years from the date the applica-
tion is filed.  Id. 
 9. Id. § 112 (emphasis added). 
 10. In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962). 
 11. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(“The best mode requirement creates a statutory bargained-for-exchange by which a patent-
ee obtains the right to exclude others from practicing the claimed invention for a certain 
time period, and the public receives knowledge of the preferred embodiments for practicing 
the claimed invention.” (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 963 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001))). 
 12. The “new and non-obvious” language refers to other requirements for patentability.  
For a brief overview of these requirements, see infra notes 34–37 and accompanying text. 
 13. Trade secrets are generally governed by state law, but many states have based their 
statutes in large part on the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, promulgated by the Uniform Law 
Commission in 1979 (amended in 1985).  See Steven Wilf, Trade Secrets, Property, and 
Social Relations, 34 CONN. L. REV. 787, 793 (2002).  For example, Alabama’s Trade Secrets 
Act provides: 
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public could reverse engineer the ideal baking temperature,
14
 that is not the 
bargain that society made with the inventor when she was granted the ex-
clusive right to sell, make, and use the invention during the patent term.
15
  
The cost of that exclusive right is that the inventor must disclose how to 
make and use the invention and the best way to do so. 
I.  BRIEF HISTORY OF UNITED STATES PATENT LAW 
The patent system is derived directly from the United States Constitu-
tion which provides that Congress shall have the power “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”16  Congress set out early to create the patent system with the 
Patent Act of 1790,
17
 just one year after adopting the Constitution.  Since 
the first Patent Act more than 220 years ago, the best mode requirement 
and its accompanying defense to patent infringement have been through 
numerous changes. 
A. The Best Mode Requirement 
The best mode requirement, though not explicitly codified as the “best 
mode” until the Patent Act of 1870,18 has been a part of the patent laws 
from the beginning.  The original Patent Act required the inventor to ensure 
that “the public may have the full benefit” of the invention.19  This was 
 
A “trade secret” is information that: 
(a) Is used or intended for use in a trade or business; 
(b) Is included or embodied in a formula, pattern, compilation, computer software, 
drawing, device, method, technique, or process; 
(c) Is not publicly known and is not generally known in the trade or business of 
the person asserting that it is a trade secret; 
(d) Cannot be readily ascertained or derived from publicly available information; 
(e) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain 
its secrecy; and 
(f) Has significant economic value. 
ALA. CODE § 8-27-2(1) (2011). 
 14. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (“[T]rade secret 
law . . . does not offer protection against discovery by fair and honest means, such as . . . 
reverse engineering, that is by starting with the known product and working backward to 
divine the process which aided in its development or manufacture.”). 
 15. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006). 
 16. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 17. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793). 
 18. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201. 
 19. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. at 110 (emphasis added). 
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soon amended to require the inventor to “fully explain the principle, and 
the several modes in which he has contemplated the application of that 
principle or character, by which it may be distinguished from other inven-
tions.”20  The “best mode” language itself did not appear until the 1857 
case of Page v. Ferry.
21
  There, Judge Wilkins interpreted the patent stat-
utes to require that the “specification . . . teach the public the improvement 
patented; it must fully disclose the secret; must give the best mode known 
to the inventor, and contain nothing defective, or that would mislead artists 
of competent skill in the particular manufacture.”22  The court’s discussion 
about the best mode was entirely separate from its discussion regarding en-
ablement, thereby affirming the existence of a separate best mode require-
ment.  Congress later codified this language in the Patent Act of 1870, re-
quiring that the inventor “explain the principle [of the invention], and the 
best mode in which he has contemplated applying that principle.”23  Final-
ly, the Patent Act of 1952, the last major overhaul to the patent system pri-
or to 2011, codified the modern version of the enablement and best mode 
requirements: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of 
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, 
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it per-
tains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, 
and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying 
out his invention.
24
 
B. A Defense to Patent Infringement: Failure to Disclose the Best Mode 
American patent laws have historically provided that a valid defense 
to patent infringement is to assert that the inventor failed to disclose the 
best mode.  The original patent act set forth this “whole of the truth” de-
fense, allowing an alleged infringer to defend the infringement action on 
the grounds that the patentee’s specification “does not contain the whole of 
the truth concerning his invention or discovery.”25  The 1793 Act strength-
ened this defense, providing that if 
[T]he specification . . . does not contain the whole truth relative to his dis-
covery, or that it contains more than is necessary to produce the described 
effect, which concealment or addition shall fully appear to have been made, 
 
 20. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321–22. 
 21. Page v. Ferry, 18 F. Cas. 979 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1857). 
 22. Id. at 984 (emphasis added). 
 23. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. at 201 (emphasis added). 
 24. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 25. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 6, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (repealed 1793). 
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for the purpose of deceiving the public . . . judgment shall be rendered for 
the defendant . . . and the patent shall be declared void.
26
 
The 1793 Act placed an emphasis on the inventor’s intent to deceive the 
public, with significant consequences for doing so—voiding the entire pa-
tent.
27
  The Patent Act of 1836 softened the consequences of failing to dis-
close the best mode, voiding only those claims that were affected rather 
than the entire patent.
28
  Other than this softening of the requirement in 
1836, the “whole of the truth” defense remained unchanged until 1952, 
when Congress reaffirmed the defense by providing that the “[i]nvalidity of 
the patent or any claim in suit for failure to comply with any requirement of 
section[] 112” is a defense to infringement.29 
Substantively, this change had little effect on the defense, but the re-
moval of the “whole of the truth” language led courts to begin construing 
the enablement and best mode requirements together, resulting in a tempo-
rary focus only on enabling the invention and not necessarily disclosing the 
best mode.
30
  This was quickly corrected by the Court of Customs and Pa-
tent Appeals (CCPA) in 1962 when it declared that “separate and distinct 
from [enablement] is [the best mode requirement], the essence of which re-
quires the inventor to disclose the best mode contemplated by him, as of 
the time he executes the application, of carrying out his invention.”31  Thus, 
since the beginning of the American patent system, inventors have been re-
quired to disclose the best mode, and a person accused of infringing a pa-
tent could defend on the ground that the inventor failed to disclose the best 
mode—at least until last year. 
The America Invents Act, signed into law September 16, 2011, has 
removed failing to disclose the best mode as a defense to patent infringe-
ment.  Specifically, the act amends 35 U.S.C. § 282 to read:  
The following shall be defenses in any action involving the validity or in-
fringement of a patent and shall be pleaded: 
 
 26. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 6, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (emphasis added). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 15, 5 Stat. 117, 123 (omitting the “and the patent 
shall be declared void” language found in the 1793 Act); see Jerry R. Selinger, In Defense of 
“Best Mode”: Preserving the Benefit of the Bargain for the Public, 43 CATH U. L. REV. 
1071, 1075 (1994) (“[T]he Patent Act of 1836 . . . altered the whole truth defense by omit-
ting the requirement that the court declare the patent void when the defendant presented suf-
ficient evidence to establish the defense.”). 
 29. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 282, 66 Stat. 792, 812. 
 30. See Ryan G. Vacca, Patent Reform & Best Mode: A Signal to the Patent Office or a 
Step Toward Elimination, 75 ALB. L. REV. 279, 284 (2012) (citing Zoomar, Inc. v. Paillard 
Prod., Inc., 152 F. Supp. 328, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Lamm v. Watson, 138 F. Supp. 219, 
220 (D.D.C. 1955)). 
 31. In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962). 
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. . . . 
(3) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for failure to comply with— 
(A) any requirement of section 112, except that the failure to disclose 
the best mode shall not be a basis on which any claim of a patent may 
be canceled or held invalid or otherwise unenforceable;
32
 
Note that this does not remove the requirement to disclose the best mode.  
An inventor is still required to disclose what she perceives at the time of 
filing for the patent as the best mode of practicing the invention.
33
  The new 
law simply prevents one from invalidating a patent claim after the patent is 
issued for failure to disclose the best mode. 
II.  PATENT INVALIDITY’S HISTORICAL ROLE IN BEST MODE 
ENFORCEMENT 
An invention must meet many requirements, in addition to the ena-
blement and best mode requirements discussed above, in order to receive a 
patent.  The invention must be novel,
34
 useful,
35
 non-obvious,
36
 and qualify 
as patentable subject matter.
37
  It is the duty of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) to examine over 500,000 applications filed each 
year for compliance with these requirements.
38
  However, the PTO’s cur-
rent examination procedures make enforcement of the best mode require-
ment during the examination virtually impossible. 
The difficulty in examining patent applications for compliance with 
the best mode requirement is the highly subjective inquiry it requires.  In 
practice, whether an inventor complied with the best mode requirement is a 
two-prong test.
39
  First, it must be determined whether “the inventor pos-
sessed a best mode of practicing the claimed invention” at the time of pa-
tent filing.
40
  This looks solely at the state of mind of the inventor and “fo-
 
 32. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 15, 125 Stat. 284, 328 
(2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 282) (emphasis added). 
 33. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 34. Id. § 102. 
 35. Id. § 101. 
 36. Id. § 103. 
 37. Id. § 101. 
 38. PATENT TECH. MONITORING TEAM, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. 
PATENT STATISTICS CHART: CALENDAR YEARS 1963–2011 (2011), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm. 
 39. Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1360 (2011). 
 40. Id. (“This first prong is subjective, focusing on the inventor’s personal preferences 
as of the application’s filing date.”). 
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cuses on what the inventor knows.”41  Whether an inventor has met the best 
mode requirement initially depends on what the inventor knew at the time 
the application was filed.
42
  Second, “if the inventor has a subjective pref-
erence for one embodiment of the invention over all others, the court must 
then determine whether the inventor ‘concealed’ the preferred mode from 
the public.”43  This second inquiry objectively looks to see whether the in-
ventor’s disclosure is adequate to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art 
to practice the inventor’s perceived best mode.44  Because of the subjective 
nature of the first prong of the best mode inquiry, the PTO instructs its ex-
aminers simply to “assume the best mode has been disclosed unless there is 
evidence to the contrary.”45  
Because of the inability of the PTO to check for compliance with the 
best mode requirement during the examination process, the risk of having a 
patent claim invalidated during litigation after the patent has issued has his-
torically been the primary enforcement mechanism for disclosure of the in-
ventor’s best mode.46  Under the new law, many argue that the absence of 
this enforcement mechanism will lead to an increase in best mode con-
cealment.
47
  However, despite the apparent unenforceability of the best 
 
 41. Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Trans-
co Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551, 558 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (empha-
sis omitted)). 
 42. Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 926 (1990) (“The best mode 
inquiry focuses on the inventor’s state of mind as of the time he filed his application—a sub-
jective, factual question.”). 
 43. Wellman, 642 F.3d at 1360 (quoting Green Edge Enters., LLC v. Rubber Mulch 
Etc., LLC, 620 F.3d 1287, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). 
 44. Id. 
 45. The Manual for Patent Examining Procedure provides: 
The examiner should assume that the best mode is disclosed in the application, un-
less evidence is presented that is inconsistent with that assumption.  It is extremely 
rare that a best mode rejection properly would be made in ex parte prosecution.  
The information that is necessary to form the basis for a rejection based on the 
failure to set forth the best mode is rarely accessible to the examiner, but is gener-
ally uncovered during discovery procedures in interference, litigation, or other in-
ter partes proceedings. 
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 2165.03 (8th rev. ed. 2010). 
 46. See Markham, supra note 3, at 155 (pointing out the inability of the PTO to police 
best mode compliance during the patent examination process and recognizing that “if liti-
gants cannot assert a best mode defense, then no one can effectively monitor a patentee’s 
compliance with the best mode requirement”).  Markham goes on to argue, however, that 
this perceived reliance on litigants to enforce the best mode requirement may be over-
emphasized.  Id. 
 47. See, e.g., Vacca, supra note 30, at 293 (“[T]here may be an incentive to actively 
conceal the best mode as long as the risks of PTO detection are sufficiently low.”). 
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mode requirement, it still has teeth.  The remainder of this Comment 
demonstrates why the new law will work and highlights the benefits that 
the new law will have on patent litigation. 
III.  ARGUMENTS FOR ELIMINATING THE BEST MODE REQUIREMENT 
COMPLETELY AND WHY CONGRESS WAS RIGHT NOT TO DO SO 
To understand why best mode law was changed, it is important to con-
sider the issues with the old version of the law.  Prior to the AIA, two main 
camps formed: those arguing to eliminate the best mode requirement com-
pletely, and those hoping to retain the requirement as it was.
48
  Those seek-
ing to completely eliminate the best mode requirement cited three main 
reasons for doing so.  First, it unnecessarily drives up the cost of patent liti-
gation.
49
  Second, because the enablement requirement generally requires 
disclosing the best mode anyway, a separate and distinct best mode re-
quirement is redundant.
50
  Third, because the best mode requirement is in-
consistent with the rest of the world’s patent laws, it is unnecessarily diffi-
cult for foreign inventors to receive patent protection in the United States.
51
  
While the first proposition is valid, the second and third arguments are 
misplaced.  The compromise struck by Congress, eliminating the best mode 
defense that led to excessive litigation costs while retaining the best mode 
requirement to promote the public’s benefit of the patent bargain, is the 
perfect solution. 
A. The Extreme Costs Associated with Best Mode Litigation 
The average patent suit costs between two and four million dollars, 
“with costs increasing proportionally to the dollar value at stake.”52  Con-
tributing to this cost is the pre-trial discovery that surrounds any civil suit.  
However, when best mode claims are involved, the time and costs associat-
ed with discovery can increase significantly.
53
  The reason for the increase 
relates directly to the elements of the claim itself.  Courts impose a heavy 
 
 48. Markham, supra note 3, at 132–35 (discussing the “pro-big business” group arguing 
to eliminate the best mode requirement and the “generic [pharmaceutical companies]-plus-
others” group arguing to keep the requirement as it was). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Siddharth Fernandes, A Realistic Analysis of § 271(g) and the ITC: Academic Hy-
pothesis Aside, § 271(g) Does Not Violate the Paris Convention or TRIPS because its Af-
firmative Defenses Do Not Apply to § 337 Actions Before the ITC, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 473, 480 
(2008). 
 53. Markham, supra note 3, at 141–42. 
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burden of proof on those asserting a best mode defense, requiring them to 
prove, inter alia, the inventor’s state of mind at the time the application 
was filed—typically a state of mind as it existed years before discovery 
even begins.
54
  Because of this subjective requirement, and the extensive 
time between discovery and the filing date, proof can usually only come 
from circumstantial evidence, which requires time-consuming and expen-
sive depositions and investigations.
55
 
While such costs could be justifiable if used solely to promote the dis-
closure of an inventor’s best mode, in reality many litigators do not use a 
best mode defense for that purpose.  In the realm of patent litigation, best 
mode claims are frequently “last resort” defenses, alleged by infringers 
with weak technical cases.
56
  In fact, a recent review of district court and 
federal circuit case law indicated that best mode challenges succeeded only 
approximately 26% of the time.
57
  Despite the rare success of best mode 
claims and the heavy burden of proof required to win a best mode chal-
lenge, a plausible best mode defense is easy to plead because the contours 
of the best mode requirements: “(1) are not precise, (2) are subject to con-
tinuing judicial interpretation, and (3) depend on facts and states of mind at 
precise points of time, usually many years before the date of litigation.”58  
Therefore, merely alleging a best mode violation can keep a weak case 
afloat when it should have been dismissed, leading to additional discovery 
that may not have been otherwise available.
59
  Furthermore, this defense 
can allow an infringer to “try the person rather than the patent,” a strategy 
that focuses on the inventor’s actions rather than the technical merits of the 
case.
60
 
The counter to the “best-mode-is-expensive” argument is that there is 
little evidence “definitively linking a best mode defense to increased patent 
litigation costs.”61  Measuring the costs and benefits of best mode enforce-
ment is extremely difficult because of the myriad of other variables that af-
fect the same costs and benefits.
62
  Furthermore, some scholars argue that 
 
 54. See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. 
 55. Markham, supra note 3, at 141–42. 
 56. Donald S. Chisum, Best Mode Concealment and Inequitable Conduct in Patent 
Procurement: A Nutshell, a Review of Recent Federal Circuit Cases and a Plea for Modest 
Reform, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 277, 279 (1997). 
 57. Markham, supra note 3, at 149–50 (reviewing all district court cases from 2005 to 
2009 and relying on another study reviewing federal circuit cases from 1989 to 1996).  Both 
studies concluded that “the best mode is not typically a winning defense.”  Id. 
 58. Id. at 142. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Chisum, supra note 56, at 279. 
 61. Markham, supra note 3, at 142–43. 
 62. Id. at 141. 
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because the inventor’s state of mind will be relevant during discovery re-
gardless of whether best mode compliance is challenged, eliminating the 
best mode defense would have little effect on pre-trial discovery costs.
63
  
However, when the Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform reviewed 
the best mode defense in 1992, it concluded that the defense did increase 
the cost of litigation.
64
  Moreover, while it may not be possible to conclu-
sively show that eliminating the best mode defense will reduce pre-trial 
discovery costs, it cannot be argued that eliminating it will increase the 
costs.  Therefore, in light of the fact that a best mode defense is often plead 
when it will not succeed, it is frequently used only to advance weak tech-
nical cases, and a congressional advisory committee determined that best 
mode defenses do increase litigation costs, the best mode defense has a 
negative effect on patent litigation. 
 
B. Why the Best Mode Requirement is Not Redundant 
Some scholars argue that the best mode is useless in light of the ena-
blement requirement.
65
  Specifically, because there is no obligation for an 
inventor to update the best mode after filing,
66
 and because the Federal Cir-
cuit has held that a company’s best mode cannot be imputed to the inven-
tor,
67
 there is little incentive to disclose more than is necessary to meet the 
enablement requirement.  Many argue that the additional disclosure result-
ing from compliance with the best mode requirement relative to the disclo-
sure necessary to meet the enablement requirement is simply not worth the 
costs.
68
 
However, despite these views, the best mode requirement is the 
“linchpin of the U.S. patent system.”69  The best mode requirement “com-
 
 63. Selinger, supra note 28, at 1100–01. 
 64. ADVISORY COMM’N ON PATENT LAW REFORM, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF 
COMMERCE (1992), available at http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/ 
patentact/acplr-1.pdf. 
 65. Markham, supra note 3, at 143 (citing Patent Reform: Injunctions and Damages: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. S., 
109th Cong. 11, 160 (2005) (statement of Prof. Mark Lemley, Prof., Stanford Univ.)). 
 66. Whether an inventor contemplated a best mode for practicing the invention is de-
termined by looking to the inventor’s state of mind at the time the patent application is filed.  
See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. 
 67. See Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[I]t 
would be improper to impute a [corporate] patent attorney’s knowledge of a best mode to 
the inventor for purposes of finding a best mode violation.”). 
 68. See Markham, supra note 3, at 144. 
 69. Dale L. Carlson, Katarzyna Przychodzen & Petra Scamborova, Patent Linchpin for 
the 21st Century?—Best Mode Revisited, 45 IDEA 267, 270 (2005) (citing W.L. Gore & As-
10
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pels disclosure of the very heart of the invention as viewed from the inven-
tor’s perspective.”70  This requirement acts as a safeguard against the “natu-
ral human tendency” to disclose “only what they know to be inferior 
modes” of the invention so as to keep the best for themselves.71  Without 
the additional requirement to disclose the best mode, the “primary purpose 
of the patent system would be frustrated because the inventor would be 
permitted to retain the details of his or her invention as trade secrets while 
gaining the benefit of the patent monopoly.”72 
Relying on the enablement requirement alone is insufficient because 
the two requirements are rooted in different policies.
73
  Enablement focuses 
only on ensuring that a “person of ordinary skill in the art,” without “undue 
experimentation,” can make and use the invention.74  However, by not re-
quiring the best mode disclosure, the “evolutionary development of innova-
tion” would certainly be slowed because inventors would be able to with-
hold their best mode and maintain a competitive advantage after the patent 
expires; a result that is contrary to the very foundations of the patent sys-
tem.
75
  Therefore, it would be improper to rely on the enablement require-
ment alone because inevitably inventors would withhold their best mode, 
depriving the public of the patent system’s quid pro quo and inhibiting dis-
closure that could otherwise lead to technological growth.
76
 
C. Why Keeping the Best Mode Requirement Will Harmonize United 
States Patent Law with the Rest of the World 
Many critics of the best mode requirement argue that it is unique to 
United States patent law and therefore serves as an impediment to foreign 
patentees.
77
  Having unique requirements for patentability forces those ap-
 
socs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Early public disclosure 
is a linchpin of the patent system.”)). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 271. 
 73. Id. at 272. 
 74. See W.L. Gore & Assocs., 721 F.2d at 1556–57 (“A patent is invalid only when 
those skilled in the art are required to engage in undue experimentation to practice the in-
vention.”). 
 75. Carlson, Przychodzen & Scamborova, supra note 69, at 272–73. 
 76. See id. at 273 (arguing that removal of the best mode requirement would “slow 
down the evolutionary development of innovation[,]” and the presence of the best mode re-
quirement “insure[s] that the ‘public receives an honest disclosure in return for the grant of 
exclusivity’” (quoting Selinger, supra note 28, at 1079)). 
 77. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 127 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10976.html (“The ‘best mode’ requirement . . . imposes an ad-
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plicants who originally filed in countries without these requirements to do 
more than simply translate their foreign application for filing in the United 
States.
78
  This additional burden, combined with the “dependence on dis-
covery aimed at uncovering inventor records and intentions,” according to 
some, “justifies its removal from U.S. patent law.”79  While the discovery 
associated with foreign best mode defense suits would be a burden on the 
patent litigation system,
80
 the conclusion that the best mode requirement is 
unduly burdensome to foreign applicants is misplaced. 
First, the general perception that the best mode requirement is unique 
to United States patent law is simply incorrect.
81
  As of 2005, at least twen-
ty-four countries required disclosure of the inventor’s best mode.82  While 
some countries have dropped the best mode requirement in recent decades, 
the trend has generally been to adopt it. 
83
  Even Japan, one of the major pa-
tent markets in the world, has a variation of the best mode requirement.
84
  
There, the applicant “should give as many examples as possible of those 
which he considers bring about the best results.”85  Because of the many 
benefits associated with best mode disclosure, such as furthering techno-
logical innovation and public disclosure, and because of the growing trend 
around the world to adopt various forms of the best mode requirement, em-
bracing the best mode, rather than eliminating it, is the better path to global 
patent law harmonization. 
Therefore, as the previous sections illustrate, Congress struck the ideal 
compromise between completely eliminating the best mode requirement 
and keeping it as it was.  However, a critical premise of the new law’s suc-
cess is that the best mode requirement will be enforceable without the 
threat of the best mode invalidity defense.  As the rest of this Comment 
 
ditional burden and element of uncertainty on foreign patentees in the United States.”); Chi-
sum, supra note 56, at 279 (“The best mode . . . requirement[] [is] especially vexing for for-
eign inventors and companies who seek U.S. patents . . . .”). 
 78. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 77, at 127 (noting 
that the best mode requirement has “no analog in foreign patent law” and that this “imposes 
an additional burden and element of uncertainty on foreign patentees”). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See supra Part III.A. 
 81. See Carlson, Przychodzen & Scamborova, supra note 69, at 283–85. 
 82. Id.  Those countries include the United States, Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, Bar-
bados, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Jor-
dan, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
and Zambia.  Id. 
 83. Id. at 285–86 (noting that England, South Africa, and Ireland have dropped the best 
mode requirement, generally citing a need to conform to the laws of neighboring countries). 
 84. Id. at 284–85. 
 85. Id. (noting, however, that “no Japanese court has yet invalidated a patent for failure 
to disclose this information”). 
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demonstrates, there is no reason to be concerned that the best mode re-
quirement will become unenforceable. 
IV.  ENFORCING THE BEST MODE REQUIREMENT WITHOUT THE 
INVALIDITY DEFENSE 
The biggest concern with eliminating the best mode invalidity defense 
is that without it there will be no incentive to comply with the best mode 
requirement.  However, there are several reasons why the best mode re-
quirement will still be enforceable despite the loss of defense in patent liti-
gation.  The primary reason lies in the fact that the majority of patent appli-
cants utilize the services of a patent attorney or agent.
86
  These patent 
practitioners are subject to strict ethics rules that prevent them from submit-
ting an application while knowingly concealing the best mode.
87
  Further-
more, filing a patent application that purposefully conceals the best mode 
could subject the applicant to criminal sanctions under the Federal Fraud 
and False Statements Statute (“FFS”).88  Because applicants are required to 
sign an oath or declaration acknowledging their duty to provide all infor-
mation material to patentability, submitting an application while knowingly 
concealing the best mode could result in criminal liability.
89
  Alternatively, 
some scholars argue that no enforcement is necessary whatsoever because 
applicants will disclose the best mode anyway—either to comply with the 
law, to meet the enablement requirement, or simply because they either fear 
the law will change back to what it was.
90
  However, one method of en-
forcement commonly believed to still be available that actually is not, is the 
defense of inequitable conduct. 
 
 86. Despite significant efforts by some scholars, the number of pro se patent applica-
tions relative to the number of applications filed utilizing the services of a patent attorney or 
agent has not been determined.  See generally Paul M. Swamidass, Reforming the USPTO to 
Comply with MPEP § 707.07(j) to Give a Fair Shake to Pro Se Inventor-Applicants, 9 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 880, 882–83 (2010) (detailing efforts to determine the ex-
act figure, including direct contact with the PTO).  While the PTO keeps a myriad of de-
tailed statistics regarding patent applications, the number of pro se applications is not yet 
included.  Id. at 882.  However, the author’s informal survey of patent attorneys, patent 
practitioners, and patent law professors has indicated that the number of applications filed 
with the help of a patent attorney or patent agent is, conservatively, over 90%. 
 87. See infra Part IV.C. 
 88. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006). 
 89. See infra Part IV.B. 
 90. See infra Part IV.D. 
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A. Why the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine Cannot Prevent Best Mode 
Concealment 
The inequitable conduct doctrine in patent law is a judge made doc-
trine that can be traced back to three Supreme Court opinions from the 
1930s and 1940s.
91
  These cases applied the “doctrine of unclean hands to 
dismiss patent cases involving egregious misconduct.”92  Over time, inequi-
table conduct evolved from requiring “egregious affirmative acts of mis-
conduct intended to deceive both the PTO and the courts” to also include 
“the mere nondisclosure of information to the PTO.”93  Modernly, inequi-
table conduct requires the accusing party to prove two separate elements by 
clear and convincing evidence: “that the applicant (1) made an affirmative 
misrepresentation of material fact, failed to disclose material information, 
or submitted false material information, and (2) intended to deceive the 
[PTO].”94  If these elements are proven, the court must then “weigh the eq-
uities to determine whether the applicant’s conduct before the PTO war-
rants rendering the entire patent unenforceable.”95 
An inventor who affirmatively chooses to conceal her best mode has 
unquestionably met the requirements of inequitable conduct.
96
  However, 
the new law specifies that “the failure to disclose the best mode shall not be 
a basis on which any claim of a patent may be canceled or held invalid or 
otherwise unenforceable.”97  This “otherwise unenforceable” language is 
most likely Congress’ way of saying that failure to disclose the best mode 
shall not be a valid defense, regardless of whether it rises to the level of in-
equitable conduct.  One of Congress’ long time concerns has been the ris-
ing cost of patent litigation.
98
  To invalidate the best mode defense but 
 
 91. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945); 
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), overruled on other 
grounds by Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976); Keystone Driller Co. v. 
Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933). 
 92. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 93. Id. at 1287. 
 94. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 95. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1287. 
 96. Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (“[B]ecause disclosure of the best mode is statutorily required, see 35 U.S.C. § 112, 
failure to disclose the best mode is inherently material and . . . reaches the minimum level of 
materiality necessary for a finding of inequitable conduct.” (quoting Consol. Aluminum 
Corp. v. Foseco Int’l, Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 808 (Fed. Cir. 1990))). 
 97. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 15, 125 Stat. 284, 328 
(2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 282) (emphasis added). 
 98. ADVISORY COMM’N ON PATENT LAW REFORM, supra note 64, at 14 (“[T]o eliminate 
excessive transactional costs, the Commission recommends removing bases for challenging 
14
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 7
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss3/7
2012] CHANGES TO THE BEST MODE DEFENSE 747 
leave the door open to the same litigation cost concerns would make little 
sense, particularly since the litigation costs associated with the best mode 
defense sit a distant third to inequitable conduct and willful misconduct 
claims.
99
 
Furthermore, the argument that one seeking invalidity is asserting a di-
rect basis of inequitable conduct, rather than a direct basis of failure to dis-
close the best mode, is also unlikely to prevail.  As Professor Ryan Vacca 
explains, “section 15 [of the AIA] does not draw a distinction between fail-
ure to disclose the best mode as a direct basis and as an indirect basis.”100  
Therefore, even if one seeks to render the patent invalid on inequitable 
conduct grounds rather than for failing to disclose the best mode, the ineq-
uitable conduct would still trace back to a failure to disclose the best mode, 
which cannot be a “basis on which [the patent may be] held invalid or oth-
erwise unenforceable.”101  Thus, with the AIA’s changes to the law, the 
best mode requirement is likely unenforceable using the inequitable con-
duct doctrine. 
B. Criminal Sanctions 
The FFS could be used to enforce compliance with the best mode re-
quirement.
102
  The FFS provides that any person who “knowingly and will-
fully . . . makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or 
representation; or . . . makes or uses any false writing or document know-
ing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent state-
ment or entry” to the government may be fined, imprisoned, or both.103  As 
indicated earlier, concealing the best mode is material because it is a re-
quirement for patentability, and failing to disclose the best mode would re-
sult in the PTO not issuing the patent.
104
  Furthermore, one who purposeful-
ly conceals the best mode requirement has done so “knowingly and 
 
patent validity that do not provide a corresponding public benefit.  In particular, the Com-
mission recommends that the best mode requirement . . . be eliminated . . . .”); see also 
Markham, supra note 3, at 142 (calling for “eliminating the best mode requirement to re-
duce subjective and expensive pre-trial discovery and increase the predictability of patent 
disputes.” (citing A Patent System for the 21st Century: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 144 (2005) (statement of Richard C. Levin, President, Yale Univ., & 
Mark B. Myers, Wharton School, Univ. of Pennsylvania))). 
 99. Markham, supra note 3, at 143 (citing NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L 
ACADS., supra note 77, at 123). 
 100. Vacca, supra note 30, at 293 n.108. 
 101. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 15, 125 Stat. at 385 (to be codified at 35 
U.S.C. § 282) (emphasis added). 
 102. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006). 
 103. Id. §§ 1001(a)(2)–(3). 
 104. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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willfully” under the FFS because all that is required is that the statement 
have “the natural tendency to influence, or have been capable of influenc-
ing, the agency.”105 
Arguably, unless the applicant is asked directly by the PTO whether 
the best mode is disclosed, the applicant has not given a false statement that 
would fall under the purview of the FFS.
106
  For example, Professor Vacca 
argues that submitting a patent application to the PTO that simply fails to 
disclose the best mode is not a false statement because it contains no state-
ment “made with a conscious purpose of evading the truth.”107  However, 
every patent application requires that the applicant sign an oath stating that 
they “acknowledge[] the duty to disclose to the [PTO] all information 
known to the person to be material to patentability as defined in [section] 
1.56.”108  Signing and submitting such an oath with an application that the 
applicant knows is lacking the required best mode disclosure could be con-
strued as a false representation.
109
  Therefore, unlike Professor Vacca, this 
Comment argues that such a misrepresentation would be punishable under 
the FFS considering the applicant’s legal duty to disclose the best mode 
and affirmative acknowledgement of the duty of candor in the oath. 
However, despite the applicability of the FFS, there is a significant is-
sue with criminal enforcement.  The FFS is governed by a five-year statute 
of limitations.
110
  The statute of limitations begins to run when the crime is 
complete, and the crime is complete when all of the elements of the crime 
have occurred.
111
  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “the 
ability of the government . . . to learn of a particular offense is not a rele-
vant factor” when considering whether to toll the statute of limitations.112  
Therefore, the clock would begin to run when the patent application is 
filed.  Because the average time between filing the patent application and 
 
 105. United States v. Dick, 744 F.2d 546, 553 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 106. See Vacca, supra note 30, at 298–99. 
 107. Id. at 299. 
 108. 37 C.F.R. § 163(b)(3) (2011).  Section 1.56(a) of title 37 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations provides further that “[e]ach individual associated with the filing and prosecu-
tion of a patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, 
which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be 
material to patentability.”  Id. § 1.56(a). 
 109. See United States v. Richeson, 825 F.2d 17, 20 (1987) (“[18 U.S.C. § 1001] prohib-
its the willful and knowing falsification or concealment of a material fact in any matter 
within the jurisdiction of any federal department or agency.  Ordinarily, a defendant may not 
be convicted of concealment unless the defendant had a duty to disclose.” (citing United 
States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671, 678–79 (10th Cir. 1981))); accord Hubbard v. United States, 
514 U.S. 695, 716–17 (1995). 
 110. 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2006). 
 111. United States v. Smith, 740 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). 
 112. United States v. Dunne, 324 F.3d 1158, 1165 (10th Cir. 2003). 
16
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 7
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss3/7
2012] CHANGES TO THE BEST MODE DEFENSE 749 
the issue of a patent is between three and four years,
113
 it is very likely that 
no one would be aware of the offense until near, or potentially after, the 
statute of limitations has run.  Furthermore, even if the patent issues in less 
than five years, someone would still need to discover that the violation has 
occurred.  Because such a discovery would often not occur until after five 
years has elapsed since filing the application, criminal enforcement under 
the FFS for intentionally failing to disclose the best mode would often not 
be feasible. 
C. Ethical Enforcement 
The best safeguard against rampant disregard for the best mode re-
quirement is the fact that a significant percentage of patent applicants make 
use of a patent attorney or patent agent.
114
  Patent attorneys and patent 
agents are subject to discipline by the PTO for violation of the patent bar’s 
rules, including revocation of their patent bar license.
115
  The patent rules 
provide, for example, that a “practitioner shall not . . . engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”116  Furthermore, 
patent attorneys and patent agents may not “advance a claim . . . that is un-
warranted under existing law.”117  Members of the patent bar are also sub-
ject to a duty of good faith and candor and a duty to disclose information 
material to patentability.
118
  These duties are two-fold for patent attorneys 
because they are also subject to their state bar’s ethics rules, which have 
similar provisions against misrepresenting material facts.
119
  Therefore, be-
cause of the significant disciplinary action that could result, a patent practi-
tioner that is aware of a client’s attempts to conceal the best mode would be 
very unlikely to aid the client’s attempt. 
However, the rules requiring a practitioner to inform the PTO of the 
best mode if the client refuses to do so conflict substantially with the practi-
tioner’s duty of confidentiality to the client.120  This conflict was discussed 
 
 113. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated 
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 237 (1998) (“The average time in prosecution for litigated pa-
tents in the population is 3.6 years . . . .”). 
 114. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 115. 37 C.F.R. § 10.132 (2011). 
 116. Id. § 10.23(b)(4). 
 117. Id. § 10.85(a)(2). 
 118. Id. § 1.56(a). 
 119. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2011) (“A lawyer shall 
not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal . . . .”). 
 120. 37 C.F.R. § 10.57(b) (“Except when permitted under paragraph (c) of this section, a 
practitioner shall not knowingly: (1) reveal a confidence or secret of a client[,] (2) use a con-
fidence or secret of a client to the disadvantage of the client[,] [or] (3) use a confidence or 
secret of a client for the advantage of the practitioner or of a third person, unless the client 
17
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at length in Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., by the Federal Circuit in the con-
text of a patent attorney faced with a conflict of interest while representing 
two clients attempting to patent similar technology.
121
  The issue was 
whether the attorney should have disclosed the first client’s patent applica-
tion to the PTO in the prosecution of the second client’s patent.122  While 
the majority took no position on the matter,
123
 Judge Newman and Judge 
Nies offered diverging opinions in a concurrence and a dissent, respective-
ly.  Judge Newman stated that the duty of confidentiality does trump the 
attorney’s duty of candor because the “privilege [of confidentiality] is the 
client’s, not the lawyer’s.”124  Judge Nies argued that representing two cli-
ents in such similar technology areas provides “no justification for deceiv-
ing the PTO” and therefore “the record amply supports the . . . finding 
of . . . [an] ongoing effort to withhold material prior art . . . with an intent to 
deceive.”125 
It is important to note that Molins does not represent the situation 
where the patent attorney or the client is intentionally trying to conceal in-
formation they know to be material from the PTO.  Under the common hy-
pothetical addressed in this Comment, where the inventor knows of the best 
mode and is actively seeking to conceal it, the patent bar ethics rules and 
the Model Rules uniformly provide that an attorney is not subject to a duty 
of confidentiality if the client is using the lawyer’s services to perpetuate a 
fraud.
126
  In fact, after urging the client not to engage in the fraudulent be-
havior, the practitioner may be required to disclose the fraud to the PTO 
should the client insist on going forward.
127
  However, the rules go on to 
provide an opportunity for the practitioner to simply withdraw from repre-
 
consents after full disclosure.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (“A lawyer 
shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client . . . .”). 
 121. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 122. Id. at 1175–78. 
 123. Id. at 1179 (holding that the disclosure would have been cumulative and was there-
fore not necessary). 
 124. Id. at 1193 (Newman, J., concurring). 
 125. Id. at 1190 (Nies, J., dissenting). 
 126. 37 C.F.R. § 10.85(b)(1) (2011) (“A practitioner who receives information clearly 
establishing that: (1) a client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud up-
on a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and if the cli-
ent refuses or is unable to do so the practitioner shall reveal the fraud to the affected person 
or tribunal.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (“A lawyer may reveal in-
formation relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves necessary . . . to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasona-
bly certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and 
in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services[.]”). 
 127. See 37 C.F.R. § 10.85(b)(1).  This is demonstrated through the use of the word 
“shall” in the rule. 
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sentation, which avoids any risk to the practitioner that he or she would vi-
olate the duty of confidentiality.
128
  At least one group of scholars advises 
that withdrawing from representation in that situation is the best course of 
action for a patent practitioner.
129
 
In light of this duty to report the fraudulent activity of a client, or at 
least to withdraw from representation of a fraudulent client, patent practi-
tioners are extremely unlikely to aid inventors in concealing the best mode 
because doing so would lead to disciplinary action by either the PTO or the 
practitioner’s state ethics board.  Furthermore, unlike the criminal sanctions 
discussed above, the statute of limitations on ethics violations is ten 
years.
130
  Therefore, even though discovery of such conduct would still be 
difficult without the availability of discovery during litigation, practitioners 
would have to wait 10 years from the date of filing the application to 
breathe easy.  This will most likely induce the majority of patent practition-
ers to avoid behavior that would look anything like active concealment of 
the best mode. 
D. No Enforcement Needed Whatsoever 
Some scholars suggest that the best mode will effectively police itself 
without outside enforcement.
131
  For example, registered patent agent and 
former patent examiner, Wesley Markham, asks us to consider the two 
classes of inventors relevant to this inquiry: honest inventors, and self-
interested or dishonest inventors. 
132
  The honest inventor will disclose the 
best mode because that is what she is required to do and she will not want 
to break the law.
133
  Ideally, this represents most inventors.  However, 
Markham suggests that the dishonest inventor will also comply.
134
  A dis-
honest or “self-interested” inventor would be restrained by the fear that 
Congress will amend the law once again to permit the best mode invalidity 
 
 128. See id. § 10.84(b)(2) (“In representation of a client, a practitioner may: . . . (2) re-
fuse to aid or participate in conduct that the practitioner believes to be unlawful, even 
though there is some support for an argument that the conduct is legal.”); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (allowing for withdrawal if “representation will result in vio-
lation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law”). 
 129. See Alan H. MacPherson et al., Ethics in Patent Practice (A Brief Visit to Several 
Areas of Concern), 574 PRAC. L. INST./PAT. 657, 695–98 (1999). 
 130. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 291 
(2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 32). 
 131. See Markham, supra note 3, at 156. 
 132. Id. at 156–57. 
 133. Id. at 157. 
 134. Id. 
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defense.
135
  Considering the wide range of views concerning the best mode, 
it is very possible that Congress could reverse itself and reinstate the best 
mode invalidity defense.
136
  Therefore, the proliferation of honest inventors 
along with the mere threat of change could be all that is required to ensure 
substantial disclosure of inventors’ best modes. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Many fear that removing the “invalidity, unenforceability, and cancel-
lation arrows from the quiver of best mode enforcement” will undoubtedly 
lead to increased intentional concealment of the inventor’s best mode.137  
While it is true that the best mode invalidity defense was effective at en-
couraging inventors to disclose the best mode, the painful truth is that the 
costs, as seen through unending discovery leading to multi-million dollar 
patent infringement suits, far outweigh the best mode disclosures ac-
quired.
138
  By eliminating the best mode invalidity defense, Congress has 
eliminated a substantial financial burden on intellectual property owners.  
At the same time, Congress can hardly be said to have brought an end to 
best mode disclosure.  The majority of patents filed in the United States are 
filed with the help of a registered patent attorney or agent.  Because these 
individuals cannot and will not aid an inventor in intentionally concealing 
their best mode, most patent applications will still comply with the re-
quirement.  Furthermore, those individuals who do not use a patent practi-
tioner will either fail to disclose the best mode because they are unfamiliar 
with the patent laws—in which case they will most likely fail to obtain a 
patent anyway—or will purposefully conceal it and be potentially subject 
to criminal liability under the FFS.  Lastly, because the few dishonest or 
self-interested inventors must recognize the possibility that Congress could 
always change the law back, they will also be forced to comply with the 
best mode requirement.  Therefore, the best mode requirement still has 
teeth, and the law now significantly reduces patent litigation costs.  Con-
gress struck the perfect compromise. 
 
 135. Id.  Markham also argues that the threat of inequitable conduct violations would 
dissuade a dishonest inventor from concealing the best mode.  Id.  However, as discussed 
earlier, inequitable conduct is no longer a threat to an intentional best mode concealer.  See 
supra Part IV.A. 
 136. See, e.g., Perspective on Patents, Harmonization and Other Matters: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 9 
(2005) (Statement of Christine J. Siwik, Partner, Rakoczy Molino Mazzochi Siwik, LLP, on 
Behalf of Barr Laboratories, Inc., Chicago, Illinois) (recommending strengthening the best 
mode requirement). 
 137. Vacca, supra note 30, at 304. 
 138. See Markham, supra note 3, at 141–43. 
20
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 7
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss3/7
2012] CHANGES TO THE BEST MODE DEFENSE 753 
 
Andrew R. Shores 
21
Shores: Change to the Best Mode Requirement in the Leahy-Smith America In
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2012
